We provide theoretical and empirical evidence that firms do not in general respond equally to changes in prices and taxes in the setting of oil well drilling in the United States. Our key theoretical contribution is that in a multi-state model, a change in output price changes both the benefit and opportunity cost of drilling, whereas a change in a state tax rate only changes the benefit of drilling in that state. Thus, a firm responds more to a change in tax than a change in price. Our econometric results support this theoretical prediction. We find that a one dollar per barrel increase in price leads to a 1 percent increase in wells drilled, but a one dollar per barrel increase in tax leads to at least an 8 percent decrease in wells drilled. These estimates correspond to elasticities of about 0.5 and -0.3, respectively. These results are robust to interstate spillovers, other state regulations, and econometric specification. They imply that using state tax rate decreases to incentivize investment may lead to losses of government revenue.
Introduction
Policymakers must weigh the benefits of taxing economic agents to generate government revenue against the potential loss of activity from higher taxation. A prime example of this economic balancing act occurs in oil-producing states in the United States. Oil production generates economic rents that accrue to resource owners, extracting firms, and the public through taxation. The recent fracking boom caused oil production to increase by 73 percent from 2005 to 2015 1 , while revenue from oil and gas production increased to over 20 percent of tax receipts in the top ten revenue states (Weber et al., 2016) . Despite its importance for evaluating the implications of tax policy, there are relatively few empirical estimates of the responsiveness of oil drilling to state oil production taxes, or 'severance taxes.'
While a number of studies have estimated the supply elasticity of oil (Dahl and Duggan, 1996; Kilian, 2009; Anderson et al., 2018) , there is evidence that consumers may respond differently to taxes than to price changes (Li et al., 2014) . Similarly, firm responses to price may differ from the response to tax rates. We estimate the responsiveness of oil drilling activity to U.S. state severance taxes between 1981 and 2015.
Our empirical exercise is motivated by a theoretical model that highlights the importance of the severance tax per barrel in influencing firm drilling decisions. Our theoretical results
show that changes in location-specific tax rates affect firms in qualitatively different ways than changes in output price. Empirically, we confirm that the responsiveness of oil drilling to taxes differs from the responsiveness to price. This difference is economically and statistically significant. Finally, we use the empirical estimates to simulate the effect of tax changes on state government revenue.
By exploring the effects of state severance tax rates, we make two contributions to the literature on taxation and economic activity. First, we develop a theoretical model of drilling decisions in a multi-state setting that allows prices and taxes to have distinct effects. The theoretical model demonstrates that while both price and tax increases affect the revenue earned from drilling in a given state, a price change also affects the opportunity cost of drilling and leads to a different net effect. Therefore, it is necessary to separately estimate the impacts of oil price and severance tax rates on oil drilling activity. Second, we use spatially and temporally detailed data on the location of oil wells to estimate how oil producers responded to severance taxes over a 30-year period in 91 oil reservoirs in 17 oil-producing states. Our core econometric results show that oil drilling is inelastic with respect to severance taxes with an elasticity about -0.2 to -0.4. Additionally, severance taxes have a larger effect on drilling than oil prices. This finding is in contrast to past work, which has often assumed that firms respond to changes in taxes in similar ways to price changes (Metcalf, 2018) .
Our analysis provides timely and policy-relevant information for policymakers in states that partially depend on rents from oil production to fund government programs and initiatives. Proponents of increases in tax rates see opportunities to increase government revenue, especially during periods of high oil prices and activity. Conversely, opponents argue that increases in taxation will lead drilling companies to invest in neighboring states. Some states have chosen to subsidize drilling by foregoing severance tax revenue on certain wells in order to attract more drilling activity. For example, Oklahoma lawmakers reduced the state's severance tax on new horizontally-drilled wells to one percent for the first 48 months of production, which equated to $379 million in tax breaks in 2015 (Blatt, 2015) .
One important caveat to our results is that firms' long-run responses to severance taxes might be more elastic. We estimate medium run responses (the number of wells drilled) of firms to changes in prices and severance taxes, but we do not analyze whether firms change their effort level towards finding new reserves or their research and development spending in response to severance taxes. Also, our model does not capture any tax revenue effects from changes in activity in other economic sectors connected to oil extraction.
While our estimates do not account for the long-run supply response to prices or taxes, they provide valuable information about how an important economic activity across many parts of the country responds to changes in state tax policy. The response to a change in tax paid per barrel of oil is inelastic, implying that an increase in the tax rate per barrel leads to increases in tax revenue. The policy implication is that state governments should use caution when considering the use of lower tax rates to attract more drilling from neighboring states.
In the remainder of this paper, section 2 reviews the relevant literature on taxation, investment, and oil production. Section 3 describes a theoretical model of industry drilling decisions using a 2-location model. Section 4 discusses our econometric model and identification strategy used to test the theoretical hypotheses described in section 3. Section 5 reports data used in the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents results from estimating the effect of severance taxes on drilling. Then, in section 7, we apply our estimates to a policy scenario to examine impacts of severance tax rate changes on government revenue. Finally, section 8 concludes.
Literature
This paper fits into two distinct literatures. First, there is a literature focused on the effects of spatially targeted taxes on investment and economic activity. This literature typically examines spatially varying policies such as state policies, targeted sub-state policies, or regional federal programs, and tests for effects on outcomes such as employment, wages, firm establishment counts, or firm investments. Second, there is a large literature estimating supply elasticities of oil. We review the most relevant examples in both literatures in turn.
Taxation and Investment
A substantial literature examines the effect of spatially targeted policies, such as taxes, on economic activity. Policymakers face two distinct challenges that include the need to raise sufficient revenues to fund government activities and the desire to design taxes and subsidies to encourage desirable economic activity. However, estimated impacts of tax policy on economic activity are broadly mixed.
The effect of taxation on investment and economic activity is an important topic in the economics literature. In recent years, econometric analyses have found that reduced tax rates can lead to increases in business establishments (Giroud and Rauh, 2017) , wages and employment (Ljungqvist and Smolyansky, 2014; Suáez Serrato and Zidar, 2014) , product research and development (Mukherjee et al., 2017) , and can attract star scientists (Moretti and Wilson, 2017) . Additionally, Rohlin et al. (2014) shows that firms also respond to personal income tax rates.
Conversely, there is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of policies intended to encourage economic activity in particular locations. A number of studies have analyzed "enterprise zones", or programs in which states provide business incentives for firms to locate in economically distressed areas. Ham et al. (2011 ), Busso et al. (2013 ), and Freedman (2013 One important distinction between our context and other empirical estimates of investment is that investments in oil wells are largely driven by geologic endowments of oil, whereas firm decisions in most sectors are driven by above-ground economic factors. We thus turn to papers which explicitly analyze the determinants of oil supply.
Oil Supply Elasticities
A large literature estimates supply elasticities for oil, with a wide range of historical estimates. Some of the earliest work estimating elastcities used numerical approaches such as Pindyck (1978) . Most historical estimates largely use aggregated data, and results varied widely from about -0.1 to 0.6 (Jones, 1990; Dahl and Duggan, 1996; Kilian, 2009) . Some have suggested that the negative price elasticities reflect revenue targeting in noncompetitive world oil markets (Ramcharran, 2002) .
Recent research has argued that the key dimension along which oil and gas firms respond to changes in tax rates (and output price) is the choice of drilling a well (Anderson et al., 2018; Newell et al., 2016) . This occurs because a large portion of the cost of oil production comes from drilling. Once a well is in place, the marginal cost of production falls close to zero. Anderson et al. (2018) find a drilling elasticity of between 0.7 and just above 1 (Newell et al., 2016; Newell and Prest, 2017) . The highest recent estimates are found by Newell and Prest (2017) , who focus on unconventional shale wells that may be more elastic due to geological and engineering factors.
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While researchers have often assumed that the price and tax elasticities of supply are equal (Metcalf, 2018) , some literature does estimate the effects of taxes on supply. Numerical work by Kunce (2003) shows a highly inelastic relationship between oil production and severance taxes, assuming optimal production and exploration over time. More recent papers using detailed analyses of a single state also find that the effect of severance taxes is small, with estimates of the tax elasticity of supply ranging from 0 to 0.3 (Rao, 2015; Reimer et al., 2017; Bjørnland et al., 2017 3 Economic Model
Model Setup
Previous theoretical models of severance tax impacts have emphasized dynamic impacts, including on exploration (Kunce, 2003) , the timing of extraction (Deacon, 1993) , and the size of the deadweight loss (Yücel, 1989 ). In our model, we focus on the contemporaneous impact of output price and severance taxes that vary across potential drilling sites. The model produces qualitative hypotheses that inform our reduced form empirical analysis.
In order to provide intuition for the empirical relationship between severance tax rates, oil drilling, and government revenue, we develop a model of industry drilling decisions using a 2-location model. A firm in every time period allocates a fixed amount of drilling resources between locations l = 1 and l = 2. The firm's objective is to maximize profit from drilling by choosing the number of wells to drill in each location. Production from both locations receives an output price, p, so that pre-tax revenue earned per well in location l is pq l where q l is the production per well drilled in location l. Anderson et al. (2018) demonstrate that in practice, once a well is drilled, production rates are largely exogenous. Therefore, we focus on the drilling decision and assume that production from a given well in location l is exogenous once the well is drilled.
Next, let w l be the number of wells drilled in location l. The cost of production per well in location l is c l (q l ), with c l > 0 and c l ≥ 0. Each location charges a severance tax equal to τ l per barrel of production. Therefore, the firm's after tax revenue per barrel extracted in location l becomes p − τ l . The firm incurs total drilling costs in location l equal to d l (w l ),
is a result of adjustment costs that occur as drilling in a location increases. For example, as the number of wells drilled increases, capital rental rates go up, pushing up the marginal cost of drilling (Kellogg, 2014) . In addition, a high level of drilling activity in one area can require transport of additional labor and capital from long distances, further increasing marginal drilling costs.
In practice, many oil firms produce a drilling budget, to be allocated over a given amount of time. This financial capital available to an oil firm depends on the price of oil, with banks and investors more willing to lend or invest when the oil price is high (Domanski et al., 2015; Azra, 2017) . If taxes affect returns to capital, they could also affect the drilling budget available to the firm. Therefore, we assume that the firm has a total drilling budget equal to B(p, τ 1 , τ 2 ) with B p > 0 and
Given this, the firm profit-maximizing decision can be expressed as:
(1)
Model solution
To examine the role of price and tax in the model, we assume the firm drills in both locations and spends all of B(p, τ 1 , τ 2 ) on drilling. Given these assumptions, the model can be solved through substitution. We use d 1 (w 1 ) + d 2 (w 2 ) = B(p, τ 1 , τ 2 ) to solve for w 2 (w 1 ; p, τ 1 , τ 2 ) such that given w 1 , w 2 (w 1 ; p, τ 1 , τ 2 ) provides the maximum number of wells that can be affordably drilled in location 2, conditional on the financial capital available at oil price p and tax rates τ 1 and τ 2 . This function represents the drilling budget constraint faced by the extraction firm.
Using this binding drilling budget constraint, the firm's optimization problem can be expressed as a function of just w 1 :
Taking the first-order condition, the interior solution to this optimization problem must satisfy:
Net marginal benefit of drilling in 1
The net marginal cost of drilling in location 1 comes from the foregone net marginal benefit of drilling in location 2. Using the implicit function theorem, and as long as d l > 0, equation 3 can be solved for w 1 that balances the net marginal cost and benefit, producing the solution:
where φ is a vector of parameters describing the production and investment cost functions in both locations. Using the budget constraint, we can solve for w 2 such that 
where H is the second derivative of the objective function at the optimum and is less than zero for an interior solution. Therefore, the sign of the price effect depends on the sign of the numerator.
The numerator of Equation 6 suggests the existence of four effects determining the optimal industry response to a change in price. Figure 1 , top panel presents each of these effects graphically. The initial equilibrium occurs where the net marginal benefits of drilling are equated across the two locations. A price increase shifts both marginal benefit curves outward (1 and 3 in Figure 1 ). The first term in equation 6 represents a positive revenue effect that increases drilling in location 1 (2 in Figure 1 ). When the oil price changes, the opportunity cost of drilling also increases. The second term captures this negative opportunity cost effect, driven by higher marginal benefits of drilling in location 2 (4 in Figure   1 ). The third term, a first-order budget effect, has a positive effect on drilling because the higher price increases the drilling budget and can increase drilling in both locations (5 and 6 in Figure 1 ).
Finally, the last term is a second-order budget effect that depends on how a change in price affects the slope of the budget curve. This second-order effect states that drilling increases faster in the location with slower increases in marginal drilling cost. If, for example,
> 0 (i.e., a negative slope becomes flatter because d 1 increases slower than d 2 ), then this effect further increases drilling in location 1.
In summary, the effect of output price on industry drilling is a function of the net effect between the higher revenue in a given location (+), the change in opportunity costs of drilling (−), a first-order budget effect that expands the total number of wells that can be affordably drilled (+), and a second-order budget effect (?). In practice, it is likely that the revenue and budget effects dominate, leading to a positive drilling response to price on average. We test this hypothesis empiricallly.
Next, we explore the effect of a decrease in tax per barrel of oil in location 1 on the number of wells drilled in location 1. Using equation 3 and the implicit function theorem, this effect is:
with H < 0 defined as before. The second panel of Figure 1 walks through the effects of a tax decrease and can be compared to the impact of an equivalent price increase. Specifically, the effect of the decreased severance tax per barrel includes the revenue effect in addition to the first-and second-order budget effects that occur under a price change. However, the impact of a tax decrease does not include the opportunity cost effect (second term in equation 6). While a price increase affects both the marginal benefit and marginal cost of drilling in location 1, a tax decrease in that location only affects the marginal benefit.
Therefore, we expect the impact of a change in tax to differ from the impact of a change in price. Empirically, this means that drilling decisions cannot be explained by a single net revenue variable. Without the negative opportunity cost effect, we expect the effect of a tax decrease to be larger in magnitude than an equivalent dollar per barrel increase in price.
Overall, the impacts of price and tax changes depend on several mechanisms influencing firm behavior. Because the mechanisms differ for prices and taxes, we expect that firm responses will not be equivalent.
Effect of Severance Tax on Government Revenue
We now explore the effect of tax changes in each location on government tax revenue. Often, severance taxes are set as rates charged per dollar of revenue. In this case, τ l = pt l , where t l is the tax charged per dollar of revenue. Given this, government revenue earned in location l, R l becomes:
where we assume a constant price and pt l has been substituted for τ l in the solution to the firm drilling problem. Since q l * w * l (p, pt 1 , pt 2 , φ) is total production, total revenue is the product of the value of total production and the tax charged per dollar.
Expressing the total differential of R l provides an estimate for how government revenue changes in response to changes in tax rates in location l:
The response of an increase in tax rate has two effects. It increases government revenue by raising the earnings per barrel produced but decreases revenue because of fewer wells drilled in the location. Which of the two effects dominates depends on the effect of the severance tax per barrel on the number of wells drilled in a location, holding price constant.
Therefore, the severance tax elasticity is estimated in the empirical section of this paper and allows us to explore the impact of severance tax changes on government revenue.
Econometric Specification and Identification
In order to examine the effect of severance taxes and oil price on drilling decisions, we estimate the parameters of a Poisson count model that includes prices and the severance tax per barrel as explanatory variables, while controlling for unobserved differences in extraction (c l ) and drilling (d l ) costs across space. We assume that the number of wells drilled in reservoir r, state s, and month t is distributed Poisson such that the probability of wells drilled, w rst , in a given location is described by:
where λ rst is the expected value of w rst . The expected value of w rst is assumed to take the following form:
The average monthly oil price p t is the expected price to be received over the life of a well and τ rst is the tax per barrel for reservoir r in state s and month t. The coefficients β 1 and β 2 represent the role of the oil price and tax variable in influencing drilling. In the Poisson specification, estimated coefficients describe the proportional effect of a unit increase in an independent variable. Therefore, the effect of variable x on the expected number of wells drilled in a reservoir-state-month is ∂λrst ∂x = β x * λ, where β x is the coefficient on variable x.
Reservoir and state fixed effects, µ r and δ s , are included to control for time invariant differences in reservoir characteristics and state policy environments that might effect the profitability of drilling in those locations. For example, some states may offer exemptions to the oil sector. 4 The cumulative resource extraction from reservoir r as of month t is captured by W rt . This controls for the depletion in the nonrenewable resource that potentially affects both production costs, c l (q l ) and well productivity, q l . Finally, f (t) is a flexible time control that allows for technological and other changes over time that are common to all reservoirs and states.
In addition to coefficient estimates, we are also interested in the elasticity of the drilling response to prices and severance taxes. Therefore, we calculate elasticities as:
where x is the mean of variable x.
One concern with the assumption of a Poisson distribution is that it imposes equality of mean and variance ('equidispersion') (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010 Dakota regulation by using the border between Montana and North Dakota. They looked at drilling within 20 and 30 miles of the border, which divides several oil and gas reservoirs, and where many wells have been drilled on both sides of the border. They found that new regulations did not have a statistically significant effect on the pace of drilling and production, but did push out some smaller producers. Each of the papers referenced here evaluate either a one-time change in policy, a change in policy in one state, or multiple changes in one state. In contrast, our identification strategy yields a more generalizable result because we are able to exploit the variation in multiple policy (severance tax) changes across states and over time using drilling decisions along state borders over the course of 30 years.
We focus on new well drilling, and not on production in the present analysis. Consistent with the literature (Anderson et al., 2018) and our theoretical model, our dependent variable is the number of wells drilled in a reservoir-state-month. Focusing on drilling is warranted because drilling is relatively easy to adjust, whereas changing production from existing wells is rarely optimal. 
Data
The data used for this analysis include drilling counts by reservoir-state-month as well as annual data on states' severance tax rates, compiled from official documents describing each state's tax regulations.
Oil Drilling and Price Data
Our primary dataset is onshore oil wells drilled in 17 states in the contiguous United States from 1981-2015, provided by the oil and gas information firm Drillinginfo. 6 The data include the drilling date for each well (spud date), in addition to the reservoir and state where the well was drilled. We calculate the number of oil production wells drilled within 5 and 10 miles of the state border in each reservoir in each month. 7 Thus the unit of observation is the reservoir-state-month. We restrict the sample to reservoirs which overlie precisely two states and exclude wells drilled on public lands. We also drop reservoirs for which the difference in the 10th and 80th percentiles of latitude or longitude are greater than 3 degrees as these likely reflect distinct reservoirs with the same name. Figure 3 shows wells drilled in our study sample. For identification purposes, we focus on wells drilled near state borders. If reservoirs in that sample are systematically different than those which are not, then our results would not extend to the full population of reservoirs. (Put differently, our results would be a biased estimate of any effect on the full population of reservoirs.) We test for selection by using all reservoirs drilled in our sample states in the sample period, and regressing the number of wells drilled in each reservoir in each month on an indicator for whether the reservoir is in our study sample as well as state fixed effects and time controls. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that study sample reservoirs are different from other reservoirs (that the coefficient on the sample indicator is zero).
One important note about the data structure is that while our raw data are primarily at the well-level, approximately three percent of our observations are at the lease level (a lease describes the area to which an oil company has rights to drill, from a single mineral right owner). A single lease may have multiple wells. In this case, we observe the drilling date of the first well only. We assign this date to all wells in the lease. This implies an assumption that all wells are planned at the same time (which is common) and that they shared a spud date (which is unlikely as wells are typically drilled serially). If we include only the first well drilled and omit subsequent wells drilled when we cannot identify their drilling dates, the results are similar to those presented here.
Also, when creating a panel of reservoir-state-months from well-level data, an assumption must be made about if and when a reservoir enters and exits the choice set of the oil industry.
In our primary dataset, we assume that a well enters the choice set on the first date a well is drilled and exits after the last drilled well. This is a conservative dataset because it is likely that a reservoir was known and the industry chose not to drill there for some time. In order to account for this possibility, we construct two alternative datasets. First, we create a balanced panel that assumes that all reservoirs where drilling occurred over the time period of the analysis were in the choice set of the industry over the entire time. Second, we assume that once a reservoir is drilled in, it remains in the dataset (i.e., a reservoir never exits the dataset). Results of our primary specification using the alternative datasets are presented in Appendix B.3.
State Severance Taxes
Information on state severance taxes was collected individually by state. We organize the discussion of our results as follows: section 6.1 presents our core results. Section 6.2 presents two different tests of the robustness of our results to interstate spillovers.
Appendices A and B presents a range of tests of robustness to identification, functional form, and other analytic choices. We also find negligible effects of price and taxes on production and well closure, consistent with the assumption that the key margin along which firms respond to these variables is the number of wells to drill.
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11 Results of production and closure analyses can be made available upon request.
Severance Taxes and Drilling
Our primary results are presented in Table 3 . The columns describe specifications based on the counts of wells within 5 and 10 miles of each state line. Recalling that the coefficients from a Poisson model are semi-elasticities, the top row shows that a one dollar increase in the price of oil per barrel is associated with a 1.07-1.13 percent increase in the number of wells drilled while a one-dollar increase in the severance tax paid per dollar leads to a 8.13 to 13.3 percent decrease in the number of wells drilled. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the response to price differs from the response to severance taxes. The proportional response to a change in severance tax is larger than a similar change in price, suggesting that the opportunity cost effect associated with a price increase diminishes the incentive for drilling firms to change the location of wells. Also, the budget effect allows an increase in drilling across all locations as a higher oil price means that the industry has access to more capital overall.
The second panel of Table 3 reports the corresponding elasticities, calculated at the sample means as described in equation 12. We see that the oil price elasticity is near 0.5, while the tax elasticity ranges from about -0.3 to -0.4. While the proportional response to a given dollar change in taxes is larger, a proportional change in severance tax per barrel leads to a smaller proportional change than the equivalent proportional change in price. This is because the oil price per barrel is much larger than the tax per barrel. These findings suggest that a 10 percent increase in severance taxes would lead to about a 3 percent decrease in well drilling, making the combined effect about a 7 percent increase in state revenue for every 10 percent increase in tax.
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We can reject the hypothesis that the price and tax coefficents are equal in magnitude at a 95 percent confidence level in both specifications. Our results suggest that assuming a common response to price-and tax-driven revenue changes may be misleading (e.g., Rao
12 The calculation is (1 + 0.1) * (1 − 0.1 * 0.266) − 1 ≈ 0.07.
Spatial Spillovers
Our identification measures the change in drilling on one side of a state line compared to the same reservoir in the other state. If drilling in the other state responds to a tax increase with additional drilling, our base estimates overstate the tax impact. To control for potential spillovers, we take two approaches. In our first approach, we add a measure of the opportunity cost of not drilling elsewhere to our core model. Our identification strategy is designed to estimate the effect of own-state taxes and not to focus on nationwide opportunity costs. As a result, we interpret the estimated opportunity cost with caution. We estimate equation
13, where τ rs t is a measure of the tax rate charged by the other state, s , for state-reservoir, rs. This other state rate affects the opportunity cost of drilling in state s. We estimate this relationship as: E(w rst ) = λ rst = exp(β 0 + β 1 p t + β 2 τ rst + β 3 τ rs t + β 4 W rt + µ r + δ s + f (t)).
In our second approach, we reestimate the core model but restrict the regression sample to either firms which operate in a single state, or firms which operate in multiple states.
Multi-state extraction firms may respond to a tax increase by decreasing drilling in the state with the tax change but increasing it elsewhere. If this increase is concentrated in the same reservoir across a state line, this could bias estimated effects away from zero. Single-state firms, though, are less likely to move (physical or financial) capital across state lines because of institutional barriers (e.g., different regulations) created by state borders. Therefore, using only single-state firms should minimize the spillover effects. Overall, our elasticity estimates remain robust to controlling for spatial spillovers via the severance tax channel from neighboring states.
Policy Simulation
State governments are often reluctant to increase severance tax rates out of concern that drilling activity will drastically decline or go elsewhere. In this section, we use our estimates of the elasticity of drilling with respect to severance taxes (-0.4) to simulate changes in severance tax rates.
To calculate the change in government revenue, we return to the theoretical model and parameterize it using the reduced form elasticity estimate. We approximate equation 9 with discrete changes in the severance tax rates per dollar of revenue (t l ) such that the change in severance tax revenue in state s, (∆R s ), is given by:
e pts is the elasticity of drilling with respect to the tax per barrel in state s. We tabulate average wells drilled per month w s in state s with tax rate t s and average monthly production per well (q s ) to estimate changes in revenue. Holding constant prices, the initial level of state production, and other states' tax rates, we explore partial equilibrium results of how severance tax revenue changes with changes in severance tax rates.
We examine a scenario where a state considers raising its severance tax rate 1 or 2 percentage points. 13 We use Texas average annual production per well from 2015 (93,256 barrels per well) and the average WTI spot price over the year ($48.79) to calculate the implied severance tax revenue using a base severance tax rate of 4.6 percent. The base number of wells drilled per month is 725. Table 5 shows the results of how the severance tax revenue changes as the tax rate increases. The base case yields severance tax revenue of $152 million. If the severance tax rate were to increase to 5.6 percent, the net increase in revenue from the higher tax rate, holding prices constant, is just over $18.5 million, or 12 percent higher compared to the base case. This estimate is based on moderate changes within the window of observed severance tax rates in the data and is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
14 Further increasing the rate to 6.6 percent raises revenue by an additional 12 percent from base levels. These results suggest that increasing severance rates from mean levels may lead to increases in government revenue in the short-run.
The policy scenario we put forth is a partial equilibrium calculations. It does not capture how other tax changes may arise in response to severance taxes, where substitution between revenue sources likely occurs. Moreover, we do not capture how oil and gas exploration may change as severance tax changes, which may have important long-term implications (Dahl and Duggan, 1996) . Finally, we do not attempt to estimate the effect of drilling decisions on future resource stock sizes. Despite these limitations, our estimates of the drilling elasticity with respect to severance tax in a state are useful for understanding the implications of potential policy changes.
13 The mean severance tax rate over our sample was 6.1 percent. 14 We do not extrapolate these results to rates outside of the observed severance tax rates.
The dramatic rise in oil production activity over the past decade has once again highlighted the importance of the sector in some resource-dependent states. With higher levels of production, the debate about the appropriate taxation of oil extraction has reignited. State and local policymakers must balance taxing economic activity to generate government revenue and the potential loss of activity with higher taxation. State governments are often under fiscal pressure and may consider ways to increase tax revenue, particularly given the existence of resource rents associated with the production of nonrenewable resources. However, opponents of higher taxes are often concerned by the potential negative effects on investment and drilling activity.
We theoretically demonstrate that changes in price and taxes affect investment decisions in different ways. Using the theoretical predictions to motivate our empirical model of choice, we look at drilling activity between 1981 to 2015 across 91 reservoirs that cross a state line to estimate how changes in price and severance tax rates per dollar affect drilling. Our results are consistent with theoretical predictions and show that drilling is inelastic with respect to changes in severance taxes. The policy implication is that using state tax rate decreases to incentivize investment may lead to losses of state government revenue.
Limitations of our analysis center around short-versus long-run effects and general equilibrium effects more broadly. We are not able to capture how a single tax change affects drilling activity 20 or 30 years later. Our results are also partial equilibrium in nature. Im-
portantly, we do not analyze how firms' exploration changes with severance taxes, which may have important long-term implications. Finally, while we control for other factors that vary across states, we cannot perfectly observe all differences that could correlate with variation in severance taxes.
Our analysis also raises other research questions. For example, what happens if state governments place a portion of severance tax revenues into permanent mineral trust funds? Do these funds help local governments smooth spending over boom and bust cycles? Can these funds be used to help diversify the local economy? How do increases in investment affect tax revenue from other sectors? Each of these are beyond the scope of our current analysis, but may be fruitful areas of future research. Overall, our analysis provides useful policy-relevant information on the responsiveness of the oil production sector to changes in U.S. state level tax rates. Cambridge.
Cameron, Adrian Colin, and Pravin K Trivedi. 2010. Microeconometrics using stata. Note: equilibrium occurs where the marginal benefit of drilling equates across the two locations and the cost of the total number of wells drilled equates to the available budget (represented by the length of the horizontal lines). In the base, this occurs with 1 0 . Price increase increases the net marginal benefit of drilling in location 1 (1). The revenue effect increases drilling in location 1, conditional on the base opportunity cost of drilling (2). The price increase increases the net marginal benefit of drilling in location 2, creating an opportunity cost effect (3). The opportunity cost of drilling in location 1 increases because of the price increase, mitigating the increase in drilling (4). A first-order budget effect increases the number of affordable wells (5), further increasing drilling in location 1 (6). The net impact leads to the new drilling level, 1 1 .
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Note: equilibrium occurs where the marginal benefit of drilling equates across the two locations and the cost of the total number of wells drilled equates to the available budget (represented by the length of the horizontal lines). In the base, this occurs with 1 0 and 2 0 . A tax decrease in location 1 increases the net marginal benefit of drilling in location 1 only (1). The revenue effect increases drilling in location 1 (2) and this raises the net marginal benefit of affordable drilling (3). A first-order budget effect increases the number of affordable wells (4), further increasing drilling in location 1 (5). The net impact leads to the new drilling levels, 1 1 and 2 1 . The lack of opportunity cost effect leads the change in drilling to be larger than with an equivalent price increase.
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A Bootstrapped standard errors
Our results in the main section of the paper consider each well drilled as an independent economic decision. In practice, firms control multiple wells and multiple potential well sites, and may make joint decisions across sites. Unfortunately, we do not observe the controlling firm identity at the time of the drilling decision, so we cannot estimate the joint decision explicitly or cluster at the firm level. In this section, we instead take the approach of bootstrapping our standard errors. Table A1 replicates the estimates of Table 3 , but with bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications each.
We see that standard errors are similar, and the price and tax results are still significant at standard confidence levels. Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications in parentheses. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01. All specifications include fixed effects for reservoir and state, a quadratic time trend and month of year fixed effects, and controls for cumulative drilling. "Different Coefficients" describes the p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for oil price and tax are equal in magnitude.
B Robustness checks
This appendix presents a variety of robustness tests. First, Section B.1 presents evidence that the core results are robust to a variety of alternative econometric specifications. Then Section B.2 provides evidence that our core results are robust to state regulations beyond severance taxes, including tests of the hypothesis that states with lower severence taxes might have other industry-friendly rules. Finally Section B.3 shows that our results are robust to alternative choice sets.
B.1 Robustness to the the Econometric Specification
This section presents a range of alternative econometric specifications of our core model.
Departing slightly from previous table formats, Table B1 shows results for the 5 mile distance bands and Table B2 for the 10 mile distance band for all specifications.
Column (1) presents results using a negative binomial model instead of a Poisson. Summary statistics show that the variance is several times the mean for our outcome variables, while the Poisson model assumes that the variance and mean are equal. While the results in Section 6 do not depend on this assumption (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) , it does suggest considering an estimator that naturally fits over-dispersed data. Results are similar to our core specifications.
In column (2), we use the Brent oil price instead of WTI. While Brent and WTI generally track each other quite closely, the Brent price is considered to be a better measure of world oil prices, whereas the WTI price measures internal US prices. Again, we find that results are similar to our core results.
In Columns (3) and (4), we use quarterly and annual time steps instead of monthly time steps. This may more appropriately reflect the actual firm decision process as drilling decisions are not implemented instantaneously. The results are similar to our core specification, Standard errors clustered at the reservoir-state level. +,*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All specifications include a quadratic time trend; month, state, and reservoir fixed effects; and cumulative drilling. "Different Coefficients" describes the p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for oil price and tax are equal in magnitude.
but with slightly larger coefficients and elasticities.
Finally, in Column (5) we also control for the severance tax rate as a percentage.
15 While the cofficient on the percent tax is noisy, we see that the coefficients on price and severance tax in dollars per barrel do not qualitatively differ.
(1) Standard errors clustered at the reservoir-state level. +,*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All specifications include a quadratic time trend; month, state, and reservoir fixed effects; and cumulative drilling. "Different Coefficients" describes the p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for oil price and tax are equal in magnitude.
B.2 Tests of Robustness to State Regulatory Endogeneity
It is possible that other state characteristics confound estimation of the effect of severance taxes.
16 If these characteristics are correlated with severance taxes, then our estimation of the effect of severance taxes could be the result of changes in these other factors. In this section, we proxy for a state's regulatory environment by controlling for state level voting and by including state corporate tax rates as additional controls.
First, we control for the average League of Conservation Voters score of each state's Sen-ate delegation (see columns 1 and 2 of Table B3 ). We choose Senate delegation in order to represent statewide preferences, as in Ferraro et al. (2007) . Then, we control for the share of the state legislature which is Republican (Columns 3 and 4 of Table B3 ). 17 The intuition is that high LCV scores or lower percent Republican can serve as proxy variables for the electorate's support for non-tax regulations. Finally, we also control for state corporate taxes, which reduce income from drilling and may be correlated with severance taxes (Columns 5 and 6 of Table B3 ). Table B3 demonstrates that when controlling for a state's policy environment, our estimated impacts remain qualitatively similar. Severance tax elasticities remain between -0.3 and -0.62. Standard errors clustered at the reservoir-state level. +,*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All specifications include a quadratic time trend; month, state, and reservoir fixed effects; and cumulative drilling. "Different Coefficients" describes the p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for oil price and tax are equal in magnitude.
B.3 Alternative Assumptions about the Choice Set
This section presents our primary model results under alternative assumptions about industry choice sets. In our base specification, we assume that a reservoir enters the industry choice set upon first being drilled and exits after the last time it was drilled. Tables B4 presents results under alternative assumptions about the choice set. Columns 1 and 2 assume that once drilled, reservoirs never leave the choice set. Columns 3 and 4 assume that all observed reservoirs are in the choice set for the entire period of study. Results are robust to these alternative choice set assumptions. Standard errors clustered at the reservoir-state level. +,*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 15%, 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All specifications include a quadratic time trend; month, state, and reservoir fixed effects; and cumulative drilling. "Different Coefficients" describes the p-value for testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients for oil price and tax are equal in magnitude.
